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Making the case for Crew-Centered Design (CCD) in merchant shipping
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a
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a

a

Maritime Risk and System Safety (MaRiSa) Group, World Maritime University, Malmö, SWEDEN

Since 2003, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has emphasised the need to address and
integrate ergonomics knowledge in a concerted manner. However, there is little guidance on the
application of this knowledge in the design of merchant vessels. Utilizing a mixed methods approach,
the paper identifies the need for crew-centered design (CCD), highlighting the importance of using
concepts derived from Human-Centred Design (HCD) to be able to design work spaces and
operational procedures that facilitate the work of the crew on board. Drawing upon results obtained
from accident analysis (utilising the Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of
Cognitive Errors - TRACEr) and 24 semi-structured interviews, this paper identifies areas in which it
could be potentially beneficial to integrate end-users in the design of ships and shipborne operations.
This paper further discusses why and how concepts rooted in HCD could be used to improve maritime
workspace and interface design, as well as the design of procedures and shipborne operations.
However, due to the specifics of the maritime domain, the authors propose that there is the need to
expand the HCD perspective, making the design not only fit a single user, but to fit the crew as part of
a maritime socio-technical system. The paper discusses that the case for CCD is imperative in the
interest of safety, efficiency and even makes economic sense.
Practitioner Summary: This paper utilizes a mixed methods approach comprising accident analysis
and 24 interviews with seafarers and a company representative, to make a case crew-centered design
(CCD). CCD is based on concepts derived from human-centered design (HCD) and expands these to
encompass the whole crew on-board and not only a single user. Identification of the need for HCD is a
prerequisite to the iterative human-centred design cycle (ISO:9241-210 2010) which enables HCD
practitioners to develop solutions with the end goal to satisfy user and organisational requirements.
This paper identifies the need for undertaking CCD in the specific ship-board context, thus linking
CCD with HCD.
Keywords: Crew-centered design (CCD), Human-Centred Design (HCD), human element, and
accident analysis, TRACEr
1. Introduction
The maritime transport system forms the backbone of the world economy with nearly 90% of the
international world trade being carried out by the sea (ICS). There has been a considerable growth in
international seaborne trade over the past decades and the world fleet has consequentially expanded to
meet the growing demand for shipping (UNCTAD 2014). More than just a mode of cheap transport, maritime
transport is a transnational intricate linkage of complex supply chains between the world economies
(Bonacich and Wilson 2008).
Vessels within the maritime transportation system can be considered as complex socio-technical
systems comprising interacting social (crew and shipping operators) and technical elements (equipment,
machinery and technology) (Praetorius and Lützhöft 2011).
The human-machine interface has featured in serious maritime casualties that caused irreparable loss
to life and property. One example is the collision of the Andrea Doria and Stockholm. It is, but one example
of how the technology introduced to improve safety was used to push for more efficiency in terms of
proceeding faster. The two vessels had seen each other, but still collided (Perrow 1984). The role of
automation has been identified in the grounding of the Royal Majesty; it has been argued that automation
alters the task it was intended to support, creates new errors paths, shifts consequences of error further into
the future and delays opportunities for error detection and recovery (Lützhöft and Dekker 2002).
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While often referred to as the source of error (Baker and Seah 2004), the perspective on human
operators working on board of merchant vessels has changed through the past 15 years. The IMO has
increasingly tried to emphasize the role of the human element as a complex and multi-facetted aspect, which
often represents the last safeguard to maritime safety. Therefore the organization’s human element vision
has been adopted and several circulars have been provided that highlight the need to support the mariners
on-board by integrating ergonomics in the design of maritime equipment (IMO 2003, 2006a, b, c)
However, while a large body of scientific literature addresses decision-support systems and interface
design (Porathe et al. 2013; Benedict et al. 2014), there is a lack of research with regard to how to integrate
end-users, mariners, into the design of work spaces and procedures in maritime operations. This article
presents results based on the work conducted within the CyClaDes project. CyClaDes stands for crewcentered design of ships and ship systems and aims to identify, locate, apply and disseminate knowledge on
how to best integrate end-users in the design of maritime systems to create safe, efficient and resilient
th
maritime operations. The project is funded by the European Commission under the 7 Framework
Programme and has a multi-disciplinary consortium comprising 14 partners drawn from the academia and
industry.
This article attempts to show that concepts derived from HCD can be extended to fit the specific settings
of the maritime domain, and that this offers an opportunity to make operations and workspaces that support
the work on-board, safe. Results from an accident analysis conducted with the TRACEr taxonomy, as well as
the results from 24 semi-structured interviews (with 23 mariners and 1 company representative), will be used
to highlight how poor design compromises safety and efficiency and can even have an economic cost
attached. The paper concludes by presenting the concept of crew-centered design and discusses how this
can be used to improve the preconditions for safe and successful maritime operations.
2. Background
Human-centered design (HCD) is an approach to the design of interactive systems and aims to make these
more usable through the application of ergonomics and usability knowledge. It advocates an interactive
design process focused on understanding the user, task and environment through end-user involvement
throughout the whole process. The output of the HCD process are systems that have the potential to
increase the overall system performance, for e.g. amongst others, decreased stress or discomfort, increased
usability, or being easier to use in terms of a lesser need for training. The iterative HCD cycle adapted from
(ISO:9241-210 2010), is presented in figure 1 and the HCD cycle and usability can be integrated with the
general design diagram (ship design spiral) (Evans 1959) as appropriate.
One goal of the HCD approach is to increase a system’s usability. Usability is defined as the extent to
which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction in a specified context of use (ISO:9241-11 1998). It emphasizes the need to consider, not only
efficiency and effectiveness, but also the specific context in which a product’s use or process is situated in.

Identify the need for
human-centred design
Understand and specify
the context of use

Evaluate design
against requirements

System satisfies specified
user and organizational
requirements

Specify the user and
organisational
requirements

Produce design
solutions

Figure 1.
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Earthy and Sherwood-Jones (2010) analyse standards for HCD in the context of ship systems. They
suggest that a human-centred approach within the design process has the potential to address the human
element quickly and effectively. Success factors of User-Centred Design (UCD) in shipping are explored
utilising focus groups by Costa and Lützhöft (2014). The meanings and the perceived benefits of UCD are
categorised and presented by the authors, who further state that importance of the approach to end users,
can serve as an incentive for shipping companies and designers to adopt the same. Bligard et al. (2014),
utilised 2D and 3D models as mediating tools to elicit end user feedback during the workplace design
process. The authors found that diverse model types allow for different levels of reflection and interrogation
of design by the prospective end users. The authors further add that mediating models to obtain end user
feedback on design in a cost effective manner can greatly benefit design teams.
Petersen et al. (2011) note that academic literature lacks accounts of systematic application of maritime
human factors. The authors go on to further state that with limited market demand and the lack of rules, the
initiative for application remains largely with individual organisations. An economic case for design in
shipping has been made by Österman (2012) who argues that the design case needs to be strengthened by
highlighting economic gains for ship operators in addition to highlighting the design contribution to safety and
efficiency (also see Österman 2013)
Reducing crew levels, increasing levels of automation, computerisation and administrative workload in
the on-board environment have altered traditional roles at sea; Ljung (2010) suggests a functional approach
towards achieving optimised manning with the integration of flexibility. The author discusses functional
flexibility and working time flexibility and argues that with the combination of functional flexibility with job
enrichment and continuous professional development with working time flexibility, the ground for a win-win
situation between seafarers and shipping companies can be laid. The author further argues for a holistic
approach when strategizing for change. For on-board work organisation and function-based manning, also
see Ljung and Lützhöft (2014).
3. Research methodology
A mixed methods approach comprising accident analysis and semi-structured interviews was utilised in the
study. In the first phase, the accident analysis of 129 publicly available accident investigation reports was
carried out utilising the TRACEr taxonomy for the coding and subsequent analysis of the accident data with
the aid of the MaRiSa database (2013). TRACEr was developed by Shorrock and Kirwan (2002) for research
within Air traffic Control. TRACEr was chosen for the accident analysis in the maritime domain as it
addresses the human-machine interface, is both retrospective and predictive in its outlook and addresses
error recovery. TRACEr has a modular structure comprising eight inter-related taxonomies. These
taxonomies can be divided into those which describe the context of the incident, those that describe the
cognitive background of the production of an error and those relating to the recovery of the incident. TRACEr
needed to be adapted to the maritime context for the purpose of the study (see figure 2).	
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In addition to the accident analysis, the study involved semi-structured interviews with 24 participants
(23 seafarers and 1 company representative). Of the 23 individuals with seafaring experience, 1 was a
female deck cadet and 22 were male participants. Of the 22 male interviewees, 18 were from the navigation
department and 4 from the engine department. The company representative interviewed was also male. A
semi-structured interview guide was designed for the study which focused on the design of spaces,
equipment and operations on-board. Participants were encouraged to share instances where they believed
the design of equipment and/or space did not support their work and was not fit for purpose and accidents
which they knew of, in which design played a role. Each interview lasted for 45 minutes on an average.
4. Results
4.1

Accident analysis

Two-thirds of the 129 accidents coded involved human-machine interaction. The largest category of
accidents on-board is personal accidents (44%), followed by collisions (29%), grounding (15%) and fire (4%)
in descending order (see figure 4). Accidents and consequential injuries to personnel feature prominently in
the analysed data. Underlying issues to the accidents reveal the role of design or lack of it, in shipboard
equipment, space design and layout. The highest number of accidents were attributed to the bridge (50%),
followed by the deck (38%) and the engine room (12%). This finding is unsurprising as the bridge is the
command and control centre of the vessel and most accidents have been attributable to personnel, decisions
and equipment on the bridge. In 66 % of the cases there was mitigated loss in which the vessels regained
operation while in a substantial 34% of the cases there was a total loss of the vessel.
A high, 19% of errors in the reported accidents are attributed to the Captain, followed by the Chief
Officer (14%), Able Bodied Seaman (AB) (9%) and Pilot (8%). The tasks which led to the task errors are
navigation (23%), followed by traffic monitoring (18%), cargo work (18%), maintenance work (15%) and
mooring operations (4%). The user materials involved in the task errors are identified in the data as radar
(64), loading devices (13), mooring equipment (11), stairs, ladders (11), steering panel (11), engine room
controls (10), Very High Frequency (VHF) radio (10) etc. in that order.

Figure 4.

4.2

Type of accidents

Results of interviews

This section presents the results of the semi-structured interviews. Each of the 24 interviews was transcribed
verbatim and the data sorted thematically. Across the board interviewees shared examples of experiences of
poor usability on-board, in which the equipment and/or the layout was unfit for purpose and did not support

	
  

4	
  

Proceedings 19th Triennial Congress of the IEA, Melbourne 9-14 August 2015

the task/operation undertaken by the seafarers. In relation to the on-board work environment, it was further
stated that the seafarers do not have the option to stop work as they have a limited manpower and their work
environment is unique in the sense that they live and work on-board the ship for the duration of the contract
and unlike other shore-based workers, do not have the option of returning home at the end of the day’s shift.
By and large, as far as possible the seafarers tended to figure out local solutions to deal with the usability
related constraints and continued their work. Two quotes from respondents given below are illustrative of
how they perceive design and shipboard work. The responses of the seafarers point to the perceived
immutable fixed character of on-board design which they largely could not alter and they needed to work with
what was made available to them.
“I tend to overlook the design … my main impression is that when you see a problem, you sort it out”
“You cannot change the design”
Location of equipment and/or machinery, space for crew movement and access to the same is vital for
seafarers in their on-board operations. A respondent observed that an increase in cargo carrying capacity
restricted the space available on container ships. Adequate space between stowed containers with catwalks
would be supportive in the work. However he further added that it appeared that money appeared to be a
deciding factor as the company focus appeared to be more on cargo carrying capacity that generated
revenue rather than adequate crew access. On the issue of ladders, the same respondent noted that vertical
ladders caused fatigue and access points, ladders and walkways could be improved with good design.
Another respondent stated that shipping yards did not consider that once something is fit, it would need
to be opened, cleaned, maintained and repaired, and on-board personnel will not have access to similar
advanced tools as the shipyard. According to the respondent it would be useful to have dedicated cleaning
areas between floors, where you can open the panel and isolate sections and carry out cleaning of drains
and pipes if required. Regarding pipes and manifolds, he added that the designers and builders should
consider how users will open the pipe, repair it or change the pipe if required. The respondent further added
that at times 5-6 pipes are put in a bundle on top of one another and to get to one pipe, one ended up
opening and disturbing a lot of others. It would be preferred if the pipes could be spread out but that would
take space. The present location of the pipes was rather low according to the interviewee, who felt that near
the bottom plate, it was very corrosive for the pipes. In relation to the pipes, the interviewee spoke of uneven
walkways on tankers that move up and down in relation to the layout of the pipes and was stated to be a
hazard in the dark.
Each time seafarers join a ship, they could be faced with different design solutions on-board with
respect to space layout, equipment and operations. Standardisation of equipment was one of the key
concerns for interviewees who felt that fleet wide, within a company there should be standardised equipment
as that has issues for safety, efficiency and re-familiarisation training. A respondent added that if one is
aware of one’s next employment on a particular class of vessels, then one could read about the equipment
prior to joining and familiarise oneself.
Endemic ‘light pollution’ was identified on the bridge by the interviewees as it impacted visibility and
could impact safety. Display visibility and customisation of monitors/screens was considered very important
by the respondents and they wished to be able to appropriately adjust the light settings for each. Availability
of suitable dimmers for the bridge equipment would be viable solutions.
Alarms were considered extremely important and intelligent alarm management systems were the need
of the hour on-board. On the issue of alarms, respondents noted that sometimes there were too many of
them, for instance from the ARPA due to sea clutter, in which case there was the tendency to turn the alarms
off and not to use them. The tediousness of the bridge watch keeping alarm which required to be physically
turned off, prompted one Captain to tell the crew to turn it off. Alarms have been introduced to promote
safety on-board but can be an irritant and unsupportive of the work on-board due to poor usability.
Mooring operations were considered dangerous by almost all of the respondents and suggestions were
made to improve the design of mooring winches, windlass, rollers and location of the bollards on the deck to
avoid obstruction. The line of sight was considered important in dangerous mooring operations and it was
suggested that the location of the mooring winches, windlass etc. should be such that the person can see
and have an overview of the operations. Due to limited manning, one respondent suggested hands free
communication during critical mooring operations. An interviewee recounted an incident of a fatality during
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mooring operations in which design appeared to have played a role. The ship had additional mooring
controls far up front so that the individual could see over the flair; over the gun valve. There was no
protection in this exposed position and the officer continued to heave and make the rope tight “The rope parted … like a sword… and then they saw the chief officer standing there without the head…they
found his head two holds away.”
Rigging the pilot ladder is an important aspect for pilot boarding operations. One interviewee felt that the
crew found it difficult to do it safely in inclement weather and there have been instances of individuals going
over-board. He suggested that an improved mechanism should be put in place which could be used to lower
and retrieve pilot ladders without risk to crew and further added that CCTV for the deck area would be useful
for monitoring the space. Adequate stowage for pilot ladders and securing equipment at a suitable location
on the deck is desired to prevent ladders from wear and tear.
Emergency drills involving life boat testing was also a cause for concern for some respondents. One
recounted a fatality during lifeboat lowering when one clamp opened and the other didn’t and the lifeboat
went vertically down and the person inside suffered an impact to his head and died of brain haemorrhage.
The interviewee said that either both clamps should open at the same time or none should open but it should
never be the case that one opens and the other doesn’t. The interviewee further added –
“No one dares to sit inside the lifeboat while dropping it. The main aim of the free fall lifeboat is you sit inside,
then you use the hydraulic jack to release the gear and it goes back, but the impact will be too high and you
are not well secured. You have belts …you have your head straps here, but it is so designed that it never fits
you. It is too high or it is too low. So it never suits you.”
Navigating officers mentioned the following equipment for improvement – Automatic Identification
System (AIS), oily water separator (OWS), gangway, pilot ladder, echo sounder, electronic char display and
information system (ECDIS), display interface, mooring winches, windlass, hatch covers, alarms, pipes and
manifolds. With respect to equipment characteristics, respondents considered the following important –
standardisation of equipment, easy operation, display visibility in different light conditions, customised
display options, availability and adaptability of alarms, location of equipment and labels. With respect to
essential characteristics of bridge layout, they preferred location of equipment, sufficient space for work,
appropriate lighting arrangements and line of sight. For deck equipment, strength of equipment was
important and for deck layout, markings and signage and free from obstructions was important. Interviewees
considered ballasting operations, mooring operations, cargo operations and navigation in restricted and/or
congested areas as important.
For the engine department interviewees, maintenance is a very important part of their daily work on
board. The location of machinery/equipment/valves/pipes that require maintenance should be easy to access
and support the work of the engineers. Largely things are difficult to access. In one instance the platform
needed to be opened to reach the pipe and it would be useful if the pipes were a little higher. The local
solution devised was to make a sign/label identifying the location of the valve and the connection of a long
spanner so that no bending was required to open it. In connection with a leaking generator, it was difficult to
replace the platform below the generator as it was difficult to lift and align the 500 Kg platform. In case of
breakdown, portable replacement and easy dismantling of accessories should be considered in design.
Remote monitoring was considered useful by engineers who believed that all equipment should also
have remote controls in addition to the equipment panels. The remote device can be kept in the engine
control room and other colleagues can communicate regarding the situation in other parts of the engine.
During bunkering operations, the remote monitoring of the tank levels was found to be very useful.
Monitoring vital parameters remotely from the cabins was also considered useful for ships designed for
unmanned engine spaces.
Starting the generators with heavy fuel oil was a concern in cold countries for an interviewee, where due
to the low temperatures the generators would not instantly start. The poor design included only one heater
for three generators and the generator closest to the heater started but the generator farthest from the heater
could not start. In order to start the generator at the far end, the interviewee and his colleagues continuously
needed to give a kick to the reducing valve thereby damaging it and necessitating its replacement. A small
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heater had been provided to save energy and it resulted in the reducing valve of the generator getting
damaged. This has attendant economic costs of replacing damaged machinery/equipment.
Engine room operations are extremely hazardous. One fourth engineer recalled that in his company he
was aware of as many as 3 fatalities in connection with the purifier. One engineer had forgotten to put the
locking knot in place and as there was no alarm alerting him that a crucial step had been missed. The
interviewee further said that the purifier should not have started without the locking knot in place.
“It started without the locking knot and purifier has something like 200 blades moving at 10,000 rpm, it
came off. So it is like the blades come flying everywhere so it cut... It is like a cutting a person up… if you
have forgotten to put a locking knot, it is very small. You may forget to put it. So there should be an
automation that if you forget to put it, the purifier should not work, should not start and give an alarm.”
The interviewees from the engine department wished to improve the purifier, ballast water pumps,
generators and increased access to communication equipment in engine room spaces. The characteristics
considered important by interviewees regarding engine equipment were: easy operation, maintenance,
replacement of spare parts, easy access, suitable location of equipment and controls, easy monitoring vital
parameters, availability and adaptability of alarms and equipment labels. In terms of the characteristics of
engine room layout, the interviewees mentioned sufficient space for work, temperature and noise. It was
noted that the problem of noise was more acute on smaller vessels and not in big vessels as steady
equipment noise was considered a sign of well-functioning equipment. For the engineers, key operations
were ballasting, bunkering, maintenance work, working with power generation equipment like the generators
and monitoring vital parameters.
The main obstacle to design and usability was ‘money’ as perceived by the shipping company owner.
5.

Discussion of results

The accident analysis (section 4.1) shows that poor design has a role to play in accidents. The type of
accidents (personal, grounding, collision, fire etc.); on-board spaces to which accidents are attributed (bridge,
deck and engine room); user tasks involved in accidents (navigation, maintenance, cargo work etc.);
involved user materials (radar, loading devices, mooring equipment etc.) highlight the areas where CCD and
usability can make a positive contribution to safety. The accident analysis makes a case for CCD with
respect to the safety of operational work, life, property and the environment.
Unfit for purpose and poor usability is a key finding throughout the interview data. Seafarers regularly
compromise, and work with poor design on-board. In several examples, the equipment/machinery/space has
been identified as unsuitable and unsupportive of the crew; and poor design does not lead to effective and
efficient operational performance, and is dissatisfactory in the context of use. Iterative HCD (ISO:9241-210
2010) and usability (ISO:9241-11 1998) need to be integrated in ship design (Evans, 1959), and crew
involvement should be sought from the beginning to achieve usability (see Earthy and Sherwood-Jones
2010; Bligard et al. 2014). Personal injuries, fatalities and damage to equipment due to poor usability, come
with attendant costs and contribute to bolster an economic case for design as put forth by Österman (2013).
The crew on-board undertake diverse tasks with incumbent functions – navigating, traffic monitoring,
ballasting, mooring, bunkering etc. The tasks cannot be performed safely, effectively efficiently and
satisfactorily due to poor design support. Function based, flexible manning with continuous professional
development could be considered by shipping operators to promote safety, contribute to the design of
improved shipboard operations, optimise available resources and support the crew as they serve on-board
different vessels in the company fleet during their seagoing career (Ljung 2010; Ljung and Lützhöft 2014)
Costa and Lützhöft (2014) highlight the importance of design for end users and state that it could serve
as an incentive to consider design, while this paper provides empirical data to make the case for CCD.
6.

Conclusions

HCD is generic and focuses on the human in the design process. The authors draw upon HCD and usability,
and propose the expansion of HCD to encompass the whole crew of the ship and take a crew-centric design
focus with respect to ship and operational design, with CCD. Shipboard operations like mooring, involve
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several crew members at once and CCD could address the unique and complex in-situ operational context
on-board. A ship has the distinction of simultaneously being the workplace as well as the leisure space for
crew for the duration of their contract; crew work and live there; and to support them in their work and life onboard, HCD would be limiting and therefore an expansion of it to embrace the crew with CCD is proposed.
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